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ABSTRACT 
 
COURTNEY A. SHORT: The Enemy of My Enemy is My Friend: Okinawan Identity 
and Military Government Policy in Occupied Okinawa, April 1945 
(Under the direction of Dr. Richard Kohn) 
 
 
 This thesis explores the planning considerations of the United States Army in 
formulating and implementing policy for the occupation of Okinawa in April 1945. 
American soldiers on Okinawa encountered not only a Japanese enemy but a large local 
population.  The Okinawans were ethnically different from the Japanese yet Okinawa 
shared politics with Japan as a legal prefecture.  When devising occupation policies, the 
United States Army analyzed practical military considerations such as resources, 
weapons capability and terrain as well as attempted to ascertain a conclusive definition of 
Okinawa’s relation to Japan through conscious, open, rational analysis of racial and 
ethnic identity.  American planners determined that the Okinawans would act loyally 
towards Japan and should thus be treated like enemy civilians.  As military government 
soldiers interacted with the civilians during the battle, however, ideas about race, 
ethnicity, and identity evolved; soldiers began to view the Okinawans as sensitive to the 
American cause.  The modification of Okinawan identity from a Japanese enemy to an 
American friend displayed both the mutable nature of racial notions as well as their 
centrality in occupation planning. 
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The Enemy of My Enemy is My Friend: Okinawan Identity and Military Government 
Policy in Occupied Okinawa, April 1945 
 
 
On May 31, 1945, two American soldiers sat cross-legged on the floor of a small 
hut in the gutted village of Nodake on the island of Okinawa.  Their hostess, a middle-
aged Okinawan woman, stooped down over them as she poured hot tea into small round 
clay cups.  Many different families shared the hut with the woman and some of them 
crowded into the main room to join in the tea ceremony with the Americans.1  The 
bombings, begun in October, 1944 preparatory to the America invasion, had destroyed 
numerous homes in the village.  Under the direction of the United States Army, several 
families now lived together in the homes that survived.   
   Military Government Detachment B-5 had operated Camp Nodake for two 
months.  Outside its perimeter, the Battle of Okinawa (Operation ICEBERG) that began 
with the invasion of the Kerama Islands on March 26, 1945 still raged as the Japanese 
prepared to fall back to their second line of defense and the Americans seized Shuri 
Castle, the headquarters of the Japanese 32nd Imperial Army.2 
Okinawa, because of its proximity to mainland Japan and the political position of 
its people as subjects of the Emperor, provided a unique battleground in a brutal war.  
                                                 
1United States Military Government, Detachment B-5, Diary, April 30, 1945, Western Manuscript 
Collection, CO445, Folders 1-4, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO, p. 33. 
 
2Benis M. Frank, Okinawa: Touchstone to Victory (New York: Ballantine Books, 1970); Masahide Ota, 
The Battle of Okinawa: The Typhoon of Steel and Bombs (Tokyo: Kume Publishing Company, 1984); E.B. 
Sledge, With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996); Bill Sloan,  
The Ultimate Battle: Okinawa 1945 – The Last Epic Struggle of World War II  (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2007). 
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The graphic nature of the fighting in the Pacific War combined with racist epithets 
proffered by both the Americans and the Japanese has caused some scholars, like John 
W. Dower, to believe that race dominated wartime conduct.  Dower’s seminal work War 
without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War correctly details the intense racial 
hatred that both Americans and Japanese felt towards each other.  His conclusion, 
however, that such hatred drove tactical decisions has sparked a debate among historians.  
Craig Cameron in American Samurai: Myth, Imagination, and the Conduct of Battle 
continues Dower’s thesis and asserts that American racism towards the Japanese 
significantly influenced the tactical decisions of the First Marine Division.  In response to 
Cameron, John Lynn’s Battle: A History of Combat and Culture argues that military 
considerations overrode cultural bias and racism.  American forces planned their battles 
by assessing terrain, determining resources and calculating weapons capability, not by 
planning brutal missions to avenge Pearl Harbor.3 
 The Battle of Okinawa complicates Dower, Cameron and Lynn’s arguments.  As 
a prefecture of Japan, Okinawa was not a colony; yet, its people were not ethnically 
Japanese.  In rebuttal to Lynn’s argument, the complexities of race could not be ignored 
in favor of practical military evaluation because of the overwhelming number of 
unpredictable civilians on the battlefield.  Dower’s and Cameron’s arguments about 
racism, however, also are insufficient because the Okinawans were not Japanese.  Their 
ethnicity confused Americans and forced American planners to confront race and 
                                                 
3John W. Dower, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1986); Craig M. Cameron, American Samurai: Myth, Imagination, and the Conduct of Battle in First 
Marine Division, 1941-1951 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); John A. Lynn, Battle: A 
History of Combat and Culture (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003).   
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ethnicity in their policy-making in a contemplative way that was more sophisticated, 
calculated and conscious than blind racism.  Rather than devising plans from intense 
feelings of racial hatred, planners considered race logically while constructing their 
policy and retained the paramount importance of practical military considerations as well. 
 In the quiet hut, over a steaming cup of traditional tea, the mood was welcoming 
and congenial; the Okinawans and Americans exchanged peaceful gestures and expressed 
kinship.4  Months before, during the planning of Operation ICEBERG, the Americans did 
not foresee such a friendly exchange. They viewed the Okinawan population as 
potentially hostile.  The American commanders and planners who devised the military 
government plan, concerned with successfully completing the mission of securing the 
island of Okinawa with the smallest amount of American casualties possible, focused on 
issues of supply and security.  The planners, however, also had to gauge the reaction of 
the Okinawan population to a foreign force invading their land.  Related to the practical 
military planning considerations of supply and security, assessing the temperament of a 
civilian population of a prefecture of Japan required the planners to attempt to define the 
level of allegiance that the Okinawans felt towards Japan.  The Americans, therefore, 
made determinations about the Okinawans’ identity that influenced the construction of 
military government policy. 
Exercising caution in order to minimize unnecessary risks to operational secrets 
and American lives, military government units worked under guidance that resulted in 
intense security measures that firmly controlled civilian movement.  As the soldiers 
                                                 
4Diary, April 3, 1945, Detachment B-5, 25. 
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continually dealt with the civilians, however, they encountered a population that was 
cooperative, obedient, and perceived as more akin to the Americans than to the Japanese.  
Gradually, the separate military government units relaxed their strict measures.  First 
hand experience with the Okinawans caused the Americans to reevaluate the Okinawans’ 
potential loyalty to Japan and their identity as a group.  The conclusions reached by the 
military government units about Okinawan identity caused the modification of military 
government policy. 
The American planners who devised military government policy and the 
commanders and soldiers who executed that policy carefully considered practical military 
matters in their decision making; however, contemplating the complex ethnic and 
political situation of Okinawa as a prefecture of Japan also contributed to the construction 
of policy.       
     ***** 
On January 6, 1945, Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. sat at a desk 
in Washington D.C. reviewing the final version of his “Operational Directive #7 from the 
Commanding General of Tenth Army” (GOPER).5  For the past three years, the United 
States had been engaged in world war.  American troops invaded North Africa and Sicily, 
                                                 
5The GOPER was the primary document for military government operations on Okinawa; it was the 
document briefed to all military government units.  Its contents were repeated in Annex 15 to Operations 
Plan 1-45.  Two military government appendices were completed two months after the GOPER and 
covered command responsibility issues following the battle.  Appendix E, Annex 1 to Operation Plan 
No.1., called “Tentative Military Government Plan for Phase II” mentioned without details how military 
government would fall under Island Command (IsCom) after the completion of the battle.  Appendix A, 
Annex X, “Civil Censorship Plan” was completed by IsCom.  (Annex 15, Tentative Operations Plan No. 1-
45, January 6, 1945, RG 407, Box 2487, file 110-5.5, NARA; Appendix E, Annex 1 to Operation Plan 
No.1, “Tentative Military Government Plan for Phase II,” RG 389, Box 704, NARA; Appendix A, Annex 
X, “Civil Censorship Plan,” March 11, 1945, RG 389, Box 704, NARA; History of Military Government 
Operations on Okinawa, 1April-30 April 1945 [L Day to L+29] by BG William E. Crist, May 10, 1945, RG 
407, Box 2487, file 110-5.0, NARA.)  The short title “GOPER” is not an acronym and its origin is not 
known. (Arnold Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1950 (Washington D.C.: Center 
of Military History, United States Army, 1988). 
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fought in Tunisia and Italy, destroyed German submarines in the Atlantic Ocean, 
liberated France, combated subversion in Latin America, sent supplies to the Soviets 
through the Middle East, and provided mortars and artillery to the Chinese.  In the 
Pacific, American forces proved victorious in battles fought from aircraft carriers at sea 
and increasingly drew closer to Japan for the inevitable invasion seizing islands like 
Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Kwajalein, Saipan, Leyte and part of New Guinea.   
 In June 1944, General Buckner became Commanding General of Tenth Army and 
traveled to Washington to participate in the planning for Tenth Army’s first mission: the 
seizure of Okinawa.  As American military progress in the Pacific moved closer to 
mainland Japan, military planners viewed Operation ICEBERG as a crucial preliminary 
step in the plan to invade mainland Japan. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Admiral 
Raymond A. Spruance and Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner believed the successful 
capture of Okinawa would prevent the war from lasting another year.6  Located 360 
nautical miles from Kyushu and equally as close to Formosa and China, Okinawa was 
situated in a militarily advantageous position to Japan, its occupied lands and its deployed 
troops.  Capture of Okinawa would jeopardize Japan’s ability to send supplies to 
Southeast Asia and allow the Allies to launch missions against multiple Japanese 
possessions.7  As a staging ground for the proposed attack on mainland Japan, Okinawa 
offered airstrips, harbors, and troop-staging areas.  The island could also operate as a 
supply depot and help alleviate the increasingly difficult task of transporting resources 
from the United States to the Western Pacific.    
                                                 
6Nicolas Evan Sarantakes, ed, Seven Stars: The Okinawa Battle Diaries of Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. and 
Joseph Stilwell (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004), 17. 
 
7CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin #161-44, November 15, 1944, RG 407, Box 2502, NARA, p.5. 
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Buckner spent months in Washington planning the details of the upcoming 
Okinawa mission with top military leaders from both the Army and the Navy while 
Brigadier General William E. Crist, his Deputy Commander for Military Government, 
worked from Schofield Barracks in Oahu, Hawaii with the rest of Buckner’s staff.8  
Admiral Nimitz, Admiral Spruance, General of the Army George C. Marshall, Lieutenant 
General Robert C. Richardson, and Rear Admiral Forrest P. Sherman all participated in 
the planning of Operation ICEBERG.  The planners, from the beginning, recognized that 
this would be a joint operation of the Army, Navy, and Marines to include amphibious 
landings, heavy shelling from ground based artillery, warships, and carriers and an 
aggressive infantry landing force.  Buckner offered his combat plans for Admiral 
Spruance’s review on the morning of November 1, 1944.  Buckner had only one voice in 
the joint planning.  On January 8, 1945 he submitted alternative combat plans to Vice 
Admiral Turner that were then accepted.  Separated from his staff in Hawaii, all his plans 
– combat plans, military government plans, operational annexes – were written at 
separate intervals, submitted, revised, and approved at different times. 
The GOPER, approved on January 6, 1945, was the plan for handling the large 
civilian population on Okinawa through the use of military government units attached to 
Marine and Army combat divisions.  Based on training manuals used in the Army’s Civil 
Affairs schools and CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin #161-44 produced from intelligence 
summaries, the plan provided a general outline of the initial tasks of the military 
government units.9  It began with the mission of military government: to “assist military 
                                                 
8Sarantakes, ed., Seven Stars, 17-21; Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 18. 
 
9The GOPER was not directly based on previous military government policies created for other theaters of 
battles; the GOPER did not arise from a template.  The planners considered the Okinawan population to be 
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operations by maintaining order, promoting security, preventing interference, reducing 
active and passive sabotage, relieving combat troops of local administration, and 
mobilizing local resources in the aid of military objective.”10  The GOPER explained how 
military government units would be structured and how they would function.  It also gave 
general directions on the proper conduct of the units under the immediate conditions of 
battle.  Primarily, the document established short term policies aimed to provide the units 
with just enough information to establish rudimentary camps immediately upon landing. 
In the appendices, Buckner and his staff detailed the structure and composition, to 
include personnel and equipment, of the military government units.  During the combat 
phase, he specified that the units would fall under the combat commander and unit to 
which they were attached.11  The Headquarters element for all military government 
activities on the island lay at Tenth Army level.  The separate military government units 
                                                                                                                                                 
unique because they considered them to be possibly similar to the Japanese in culture and allegiance.  The 
GOPER followed the Army standard operations order format and covered typical topics taught in the Civil 
Affairs schools – local government, medical care, supply, finance etc. – but the contents of the GOPER 
varied from previous military government policies created for areas like the Phillipines, Guadalcanal, 
Saipan, and the Marianas. (Military Government, General Order No.2-44, Tinian, September 2, 1944, RG 
389, Box 844, NARA, Training Syllabus, Charlottesville, VA, October 21, 1944, RG 496, Box 351, 
NARA, p.1; Military Government, General Order No. 1-44, Tinian, August 26, 1944, RG 389, Box 844, 
NARA; Plan for the Naval Military Government of the Marianas, RG 398, Box 844, NARA; Political 
Directive for the Military Government of the Caroline Islands in the Central Pacific, Appendix D, March 
1944, RG 389, Box 844, NARA; Plan for the Naval Military Government of the East Caroline Islands, RG 
389, Box 844, NARA.) 
    
10Operational Directive #7 from the Commanding General of Tenth Army, January 6, 1945, RG 290, Box 
2196, NARA, p.1. 
 
11Upon completion of the assault, the military government teams were to be reassigned to Island Command 
(IsCom) under Major General Fred C. Wallace, USMC.  This transition was originally planned to begin 
once camps were set up in the rear areas.  By the end of the battle (the garrison phase), all military 
government units were to be under IsCom.  In actuality, however, the transition to IsCom took much longer 
and was not completed until July 2, 1945.  The military government units remained under the control of the 
combat divisions, XXIV Corps and Tenth Army military government staffs.  IsCom existed as primarily a 
staff section for the majority of the battle. (Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 18, 27; 
Captain Roy E. Appleman, notes, RG 407, File 224-12, NARA, p.2; CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin #161-
44, November 15, 1944, RG 407, Box 2502, NARA; XXIV Corps Military Government Daily Operations 
Log, RG 407, File 224-12, NARA; Military Government Operations in the Ryukyu Area, Appendix V, Part 
I-IV, August 2, 1945, RG 407, Box 2487, File 110-5, NARA; LTC John Stevens and MSG James M. 
Burns, Okinawa Diary, April 30, 1945, RG 407, Box 2441, NARA). 
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attached to the combat divisions each consisted of four detachments with different 
individual missions.  “A” detachments were to move forward with the combat units and 
seek out dislocated civilians for evacuation.  The civilians would then move away from 
the frontlines towards the “B” detachments which were to follow closely behind the “A” 
detachments and establish temporary camps that processed civilians.  Further back, the 
“C” detachments were to build more stable camp environments that had the capacity to 
sustain a large civilian population for an extended period of time.  Lastly, the “D” 
detachments would process even larger populations – 60,000-100,000 – and had the 
potential for permanency.12  The basic concept funneled civilians gradually from the 
dangerous battlefront to the relatively safe rear areas through a series of detachments and 
camps that increasingly became more established and larger in size. 
Buckner gave little guidance about the personal conduct of his troops towards 
civilians.13  He only addressed their relationship in one statement.  Under the title of 
“Degree of Control,” he ordered the commanders to “demand and enforce obedience,” 
and thus directed that civilians could earn back their freedom only by following the 
instructions of the occupiers.  He delegated to his subordinate commanders the “powers 
of government as international law and military necessity may require.”14 The GOPER 
was a flexible document that allowed for interpretation by subordinate commanders as 
                                                 
12Operational Directive #7, January 6, 1945, Commanding General, Tenth Army, 2-4. 
 
13Details about specific treatment of and interaction between civilians and American forces were not 
included in most literature about military government, civil affairs, and occupation.  Only training materials 
used at the Civil Affairs training schools for officers briefly instructed that all cultural and religious 
customs be maintained and civilians be treated with respect.  All other information distributed to the 
soldiers eliminated the topic, stating only that it would addressed as required. (Training Syllabus, 
Charlottesville, VA, October 21, 1944, RG 496, Box 351, NARA, p.1; Tenth Army Pamphlet – Information 
on Military Government, February 13, 1945, RG 389, Box 704, NARA, p.7). 
 
14Operational Directive #7, January 6, 1945, Commanding General, Tenth Army, 1. 
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conditions warranted.15  As the battle changed, commanders on all levels had the freedom 
to decide based on their own judgment.  With language like “to the extent required” and 
“take necessary action,” Buckner made the GOPER as useable a document as subordinate 
commanders could desire.  It clearly stated, however, that “rigid control of civilians will 
be exercised.”16   
Policies for the immediate occupation outlined in the GOPER addressed supply, 
medical needs, and civilian labor forces for use both within camps and with tactical units.  
An initial supply of food for the civilian population was planned to arrive with the assault 
divisions.  Amounts of foods typical of an Okinawan diet, such as rice, beans, and fish, 
were calculated per individual and per 1,000 civilians.  After the initial supplies brought 
ashore by the Americans were depleted, the policy called for soldiers to shift to captured 
local island resources.  Policies for clothing and transportation were similar – an initial 
stock would land with the assault and resupply became the responsibility of military 
government by means of reconnaissance and capture of local items.  The policy forbade 
the issuing of United States military rations except in cases of undefined emergency.  The 
GOPER emphasized the ingenuity of the soldiers to procure the necessary supplies while 
at the same time planning for an adequate initial stock.  The policy designated the   
requirements of food and clothing as those “minim(ally) essential.”17  
Medical policy involved treating casualties, containing contagious disease, and 
creating a sanitary environment.  The guidance directed American military medical 
                                                 
15Interview with LTG Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., LTC John Stevens and MSG James M. Burns, Okinawa 
Diary, March 21, 1945, RG 407, Box 2441, NARA. 
 
16Ibid.; Operational Directive #7, January 6, 1945, Commanding General, Tenth Army, 2, 9. 
 
17Ibid., 5. 
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personnel to dispense care only “to the extent required to prevent interference with 
military operations and meet humanitarian needs.”18  Guidance dictated that medical 
personnel transport the urgently sick or wounded patients to hospitals, quarantine those 
with contagious ailments, and maintain strict supervision over conditions to ensure proper 
cleanliness.  The order also stated that Okinawan medical doctors and nurses, local 
facilities, and local equipment should be used only for civilian patients.19  
Buckner and his staff viewed the Okinawans as a potential source of labor that the 
combat units could use if provided food, water, and transportation.  Civilians would not 
be paid.  The policy also directed the combat units to guard civilians while they worked.  
The responsibility of organizing the labor fell to the military government commander of 
each camp whose duty it was to coordinate the labor assignments.20  Civilians would not 
have a choice about participating in the labor program.   
The GOPER included a section that briefly mentioned locally-run government as 
an eventual goal but an impractical reality in the initial occupation.  The majority of the 
government section dealt with censorship and Okinawan cultural institutions.  Civilians 
residing in camps were prohibited communication with those outside the camp.  The 
policy denied the use and/or creation of a postal service and empowered military 
government personnel to “take necessary action to prevent communication with enemy 
civilians.”21  Policies regarding cultural arts and monuments ordered their protection and 
suggested the option of instituting educational programs for civilians.22  
                                                 
18Ibid., 9. 
 
19Ibid., 10. 
 
20Ibid., 11. 
 
21Ibid., 9. 
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Buckner thus laid a base for military government operations.  Naturally, his policy 
emphasized the primacy of the tactical military mission over the comfort of the civilians, 
establishing the standard for the needs of the civilians at the lowest level possible to meet 
the minimal essential requirements for sustaining life.  Buckner and his staff included few 
details in the GOPER and neglected any discussion of interaction between soldiers and 
civilians.  What details were included contributed unrelated, ancillary information that 
did not address the conduct of American soldiers. 
As the Commanding General of Tenth Army, General Buckner wanted first to 
secure the island in order to sever Japanese supply lines and organize and launch the final 
attack on the mainland.  In the GOPER, the mission of the military government included 
a statement about “preventing interference with military operations.”23 He ordered the 
military government to remove the civilians from the battlefield because their presence 
could jeopardize the tactical mission; he did not order their evacuation out of a concern 
for their safety.  “As for the civilians, the main idea is to keep them out of the way,” he 
told an interviewer on March 21, 1945, “and to minimize difficulties for our own 
forces.”24  While he and his staff worked on the GOPER, he worked simultaneously with 
his staff on the invasion plans.  They focused on balance of fires through the combined 
use of artillery and infantry, decided where to land, and analyzed intelligence reports and 
maps in an attempt to identify the location of the Japanese forces.  Buckner based his 
choices on an assessment of the potential combat situation and how that situation could 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
22Ibid., 9. 
 
23Ibid., 1. 
 
24Interview with LTG Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., LTC John Stevens and MSG James M. Burns, Okinawa 
Diary, March 21, 1945, RG 407, Box 2441, NARA. 
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produce American victory.  The GOPER did not in actuality focus on the conduct of 
military government.  Instead, it focused on how to minimize the impact of civilians on 
the battle.    
Buckner’s command emphasis on the battle shaped military government policy 
completely.  He directed the “A” detachments to conduct reconnaissance and locate 
civilians in forward areas where they might be hiding out of fear.  Tactically, however, 
Buckner’s battle plans did not take into account stray civilians mixed in with Japanese 
troops.  He required the military government detachments to support the battle by 
removing civilians as quickly as possible.  Buckner’s tactics included using 
flamethrowers to kill Japanese troops in caves; Okinawans hiding in those caves would 
also die.  His priorities lay with the safety of his soldiers in combat.  He aimed to obtain 
his objective with the smallest amount of American casualties as possible. 
Supply also concerned Buckner deeply.  The distance between Okinawa, the 
Philippines, where the invasion force assembled, and the United States, coupled with the 
complication of the continuation of a two front war challenged supply operations.25  
Buckner and his staff actively manipulated loading doctrine and managed initial supply 
and resupply in order to stretch Tenth Army’s assets.  His emphasis on supply carried 
over to his guidance for military government.  The detailed supply section in the GOPER, 
which included extensive appendices about specific food ration amounts and equipment 
allocation, demonstrated his preoccupation with resources.  The document repeatedly 
ordered soldiers to salvage local property for additional food, clothing, and 
                                                 
25Sarantakes, ed., Seven Stars, 5.  The Americans landed 548,000 servicemembers and docked 1,300 ships. 
(Frank, Okinawa, 50; Ota, The Battle of Okinawa, x; Sledge, With the Old Breed, 192; Sloan, The Ultimate 
Battle, 96).   
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transportation, and assigned a non-commissioned officer to handle the salvage effort.26  
The directive banned giving United States military rations to civilians because Buckner 
lacked the provisions beyond those needed for American troops.  Proper control and 
rationing of all types of supply occupied a central component of mission success.  
Buckner emphasized supply conservation in the mission statement to military 
government: the “mobilizing (of) local resources (is) in the aid of military objective.”27     
Buckner’s strict, yet sparse procedural guidance on medical aid also demonstrated 
his fear of a supply shortage.  He approved the limitation of medical care to the bare 
necessities and assumed the cooperation of Okinawan medical doctors and nurses.28  His 
staff included medical supplies on a list of salvage items and the GOPER proclaimed that 
“maximum utilization of local resources and salvaged equipment [was] essential.”29 
In addition to legitimate command concerns about mission success, minimizing 
casualties and adequate resources, Buckner, Crist, and his staff faced a unique 
demographic on Okinawa.  Unlike previous campaigns in the Pacific Theater, Okinawa’s 
status as a prefecture of Japan meant that Allied forces would confront civilians who 
were subjects of the Emperor and who the American planners categorized as “essentially 
Japanese people, of partly Japanese stock.”30  With a population estimated at 463,000, 
military planners had to consider possible reactions of the Okinawans to the invasion.  
Crist regarded the issue of the mind-set of the Okinawans as “the most vital question in 
                                                 
26Operational Directive #7, January 6, 1945, Commanding General, Tenth Army, 7. 
 
27Ibid., 1. 
 
28Ibid.,10. 
 
29Ibid., 7. 
 
30Captain Roy E. Appleman, notes, RG 407, File 224-12, NARA, 1.  In reality, the Okinawans were of a 
different ethnicity completely – Ryukyan - from the mainland Yamato Japanese.   
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connection with military government.”31  In devising policy, Buckner, Crist and his staff 
assessed the temperament and loyalty of the Okinawans to the Japanese in an effort to 
determine the civilian response to the American presence.   
All commanders, planners and most soldiers had access to a number of resources 
that addressed the cultural background of the Okinawans and their historic ties to Japan.  
Intelligence produced the CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin #161-44, and the Civil Affairs 
schools distributed the Ryukyu Handbook.  Popular magazines and books about Japan, its 
prefectures and its colonies also were available.  Fortune magazine, for example, devoted 
their entire April issue in 1944 to the population, politics, economics and militarism of 
Japan. 
Each publication had a different intended audience.  The wide readership of 
Fortune included everyone from Buckner, Crist and other staff members to ordinary 
soldiers waiting for transport ships to families back in the United States.32  Fairfield 
Osborn wrote his book, The Pacific World: its vast distances, its lands and the life upon 
them and its people, specifically for American service members and their families with 
duty in the Pacific.33  Osborn called Okinawa a “province” of Japan and Fortune 
magazine emphasized that “Japan coveted not only pieces of the continent but islands, 
and from China she wrung Formosa and the Ryukyus.” 34  Fortune also asserted that the 
people of Japan had different ethnicities, stating that “the Japanese people are not a 
                                                 
31History of Military Government Operations on Okinawa, May 10, 1945, BG William E. Crist. 
 
32Sarantakes, ed, Seven Stars, 22. 
 
33Osborn’s book was not sponsored by the United States War Department and its readership can only be 
assumed. 
 
34
“The Geography of Conquest,” Fortune (April 1944): 161; Fairfield Osborn, The Pacific World: Its vast 
distances, its lands and the life upon them, and its people (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1944), 
184.  These publications portrayed Okinawa as a colony which it was not.   
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homogeneous race.  They are a mixture of half a dozen distinct Asiatic and South Sea 
peoples of different physical and cultural characteristics.”35   
The Army’s Civil Affairs schools issued the Ryukyu Handbook to its officers 
slated for assignment in the Pacific.  In three hundred pages, the handbook, covered 
geography, agriculture, economics, culture, and history.  Like the popular publications, 
the handbook attempted to understand the complicated political situation of Okinawa and 
the ethnic background of its people.  It acknowledged the Japanese invasion and conquest 
of the island by the Satsuma clan in 1609 and described the current position of Okinawa 
“as an integral part of the (Japanese) state.”36  It depicted the Okinawans as a racially 
mixed subordinate group who spoke both Japanese and the local dialect Luchuan.  Japan, 
according to the handbook, had successfully integrated Okinawa into its own government 
as a prefecture.37  Okinawa housed four branch prefectural offices and its men voted for 
representatives who served both locally and in the Imperial Diet in Tokyo.38   
Along with the Ryukyu Handbook, Tenth Army staff studied the CINCPAC-
CINCPOA Bulletin #161-44, which served as the “enemy situation” supplement to 
intelligence summaries.39  Like the handbook, the publication acknowledged the ethnic 
                                                 
35
“The Citizens,” Fortune (April 1944):149. 
 
36The Ryukyus Handbook, Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Handbook, 1944, RG 290, Box 3199, 
NARA, p.VII. 
 
37This assessment was slightly incorrect and misleading.  While Okinawa was legally a prefecture of Japan, 
Japan maintained a higher level of control over Okinawa than its other prefectures.  For example, all high 
prefectural positions in Okinawa were held by the Japanese rather than locals.  The government structure in 
Okinawa was the same as other prefectures but it was dominated by the Japanese. (Yenob –PW-188, POW 
interrogation, May 16, 1945, RG 389, Box 844, NARA;  Masamichi S. Inoue, Okinawa and the U.S. 
Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization  [New York: Columbia University Press, 2007] 55-
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38The Ryukyus Handbook, 1944, Department of the Army, p. VIII. 
 
39History of Military Government Operations on Okinawa, May 10, 1945, BG William E. Crist, 17. 
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difference between the Okinawans and the Japanese while simultaneously linking the two 
groups based on “similar characteristics.”40  It also recognized the fact that Okinawans 
spoke the Luchuan dialect in rural areas and schools instructed the Japanese language.  
Politically, the bulletin explained the historical relationship of Okinawa and Japan and 
addressed Japan’s invasion of the island and Okinawa’s current status as a legitimate 
prefecture of the Empire.  Unlike the handbook, however, the bulletin alluded to a tension 
between the Okinawans and the Japanese.  Despite the current incorporation of Okinawa 
into the Japanese government, the differences between the two groups in practiced 
customs and religion as well as their shared history of Okinawa’s invasion complicated 
the political relationship.  The bulletin fully concluded that the Japanese considered the 
Okinawans more like the Chinese then themselves and mentioned the Japanese 
indoctrination program created to integrate Okinawa into the Empire culturally.41  The 
document also more accurately explained how much influence Okinawa prefecture truly 
had in the Imperial Diet.  Okinawa’s government did fall within the Japanese system and 
had representatives and voting districts as the Ryukyu Handbook explained.  Japanese 
subjects from mainland, however, served in the most important government positions in 
Okinawa and thereby prevented the Okinawans from participating fully in their own 
governance, creating resentment towards the Japanese among the Okinawans and 
contributing to oppressive feelings of inferiority.42 
                                                 
40CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin #161-44, November 15, 1944, RG 407, Box 2502, NARA, 5, 10. 
 
41Ibid., 10, 11. 
 
42Ibid., 12; Yenob –PW-188, POW interrogation, May 16, 1945, RG 389, Box 844, NARA; Inoue, 
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Intelligence summaries of Okinawan culture, geography, politics and history 
made the task of predicting the disposition of the civilians complicated.  The Okinawans 
had lost their independent kingdom to an invading force that viewed them as ethnically 
different and inferior; yet, the incorporation of Okinawa as a prefecture and integral part 
of the Empire meant the island was not a colony.  An invading foreign country could 
either inspire the Okinawans to support Japan or ignite long repressed feelings of 
resentment towards the Japanese.  Crist lamented that the intelligence studies of Okinawa 
yielded “no satisfactory answer (about) the attitude of the Okinawans.”43 
CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin #161-44 offered a recommendation.  “It would be 
dangerous,” stated the bulletin, “to conclude that anything less than active resistance to 
invasion can be expected from the population.”  With time and an extensive propaganda 
campaign, the bulletin suggested, the Okinawans would succumb peacefully to American 
authority.44  The recommendation made sense to Buckner, Crist and the subordinate 
commanders.  “At worst,” Crist thought, “military government expected to find a 
fanatical population, typically Japanese in attitude, which would resist to the death and 
commit mass suicide rather than surrender.”45  Soon to confront a population that 
politically may have allegiance to Japan but ethnically was alienated, Buckner acted 
responsibly as a commander and approved a military government policy that best 
supported the combat mission.  Despite his Southern upbringing and racist tendencies, he 
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planned for the worst case scenario in order to best prepare his troops for unpredictable 
situations on the battlefield and to minimize American casualties.46  Throughout the 
GOPER, he instructed the military government units to proceed carefully with the 
civilians and safeguard not only themselves but also secret information.  His order for the 
“rigid control of civilians” served the dual purpose of eliminating them as battlefield 
obstacles and preventing them from acting as enemies once inside the camps.  His orders 
prohibiting a postal system, ordering censorship and forbidding the communication of 
civilians with any person outside the camps were designed to prevent access to and 
distribution of information to Japanese troops.47   
Buckner’s combatant commanders, who had access to the same intelligence 
summaries, also concluded that preparing for the possibility of hostile civilians was the 
best course of action.  Considering the Okinawans to be similar to the Japanese in 
perceived cunning, Major General John Hodge, XXIV Corps commander, “anticipated 
great trouble with civilians and soldiers dressed as civilians on target.”  He wanted the 
                                                 
46Buckner was the son of a Confederate General and shared similar beliefs with his father on race and the 
South.  He lamented the South’s loss of the Civil War and considered Southerners’ cause noble.  He studied 
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decision to view the Okinawan civilian population as enemy was widely accepted and shared by his fellow 
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Okinawans kept behind barriers away from the American soldiers.  He warned that 
fraternization could put valuable information, and subsequently soldiers’ lives, at risk.48  
In line with the recommendations in the bulletin and staff intelligence estimates, 
Tenth Army launched an intensive propaganda campaign.  In hopes of exploiting the 
ethnic differences between the Okinawans and the Japanese, propaganda aimed at 
Okinawans emphasized the inequalities that the Japanese imposed on them.  Leaflet 527 
asked the civilians: “What obligations have you to the Japanese?  Is this your war? Or is 
it really the war of Japanese leaders who have dominated you for many decades?”49  
American forces, therefore, attempted to capitalize on the ethnic tension between the 
Okinawans and the Japanese and to turn the Okinawans into amicable friends. 
American planners, therefore, used cultural information about the Okinawans to 
shape military government policies.  They actively assessed the complicated relationship 
between Japan and Okinawa and thus attempted to predict the civilian reaction to the 
Americans.  The policies took seriously Okinawa’s status as a prefecture but also sought 
to exploit Okinawan feelings of disadvantage and inferiority. The Americans’ 
understanding of the identity of the Okinawans, whether as Japanese subjects or as 
conquered people with a separate ethnicity, contributed greatly to how they devised 
military government policy and how they envisioned the conduct of the military 
government units.   
***** 
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49Leaflet 527, X-1, X-10, 521, X-12, 530, RG 407, Box 2502, NARA;  Report of Psychological Warfare 
Activities Okinawa Operation, September 15, 1945, RG 407, Box 2502, File 110-39, NARA. 
 20 
 
 
 While Buckner attended meetings and developed plans in Washington, his forces 
were spread across the globe in various states of preparation.  Crist and his staff 
continued to produce materials from Hawaii.  His Army combat divisions waited on 
Leyte after successfully securing the island under the leadership of General MacArthur.  
His military government officers arrived at Fort Ord, California from the Civil Affairs 
training schools at Princeton and Columbia University on December 28, 1944 and, once 
there, received their assignments to specific military government units with an 
undisclosed overseas mission.  Enlisted soldiers for the military government units also 
arrived at Fort Ord between late December and early January from various other units 
and as draftees.  They had not received training at the military schools in New Jersey and 
New York because those institutions existed for officer education only.  Their arrival in 
California marked the first time that the enlisted men learned that they would work in 
civil affairs and thus, they began their first classes on what their jobs would entail.50  
 Within four days of their arrival, the soldiers boarded their transport ships and 
headed across the Pacific.  Over the two month voyage, the units received their mission, 
instructed the soldiers in the basics of their duties, and conducted preparations ranging 
from equipment issue and task training to tracking soldier’s pay.  The absence of any 
previous civil affairs training for the enlisted soldiers challenged the unprepared officers.    
 Officers drafted the onboard training plan at Fort Ord.  In addition to generic 
Army topics such as rifle familiarization and disease prevention, they taught the basics of 
civil affairs using the Ryukyu Handbook, CINCPAC-CINCPOA bulletin #161-44, the 
Tenth Army Pamphlet – Information on Military Government, and the Tenth Army 
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Technical Bulletin on Military Government approved by Crist.51  Officers with 
experience in Japanese language and culture, like Captain E.H. Horn of Detachment B-5, 
Company A, who had spent nineteen years in Japan, instructed all soldiers in Japanese 
language and “characteristics.”52    
  The enlisted soldiers, therefore, received the same information about 
Okinawa as the officers who planned the operation.  The Tenth Army Pamphlet, written 
specifically for the troops and approved on February 13, 1945, further enforced the idea 
that the Okinawans could act in dangerous ways towards American forces.  The pamphlet 
emphasized the threat of civilians, calling them “weapons of war” and “enemy civilians.”  
It warned that Japanese soldiers might insert themselves into the population in order to 
spy.53  The document also advised against soldiers interacting with civilians for fear of 
catching diseases that infected people “regardless of color or race.”54  In its conclusion, it 
instructed soldiers to report suspicious civilians to their superiors.55  Training onboard the 
ships described the population as “proper prisoners of war [or] war criminals, or they can 
be civilians, depending on how they act . . . [but they] cannot pose as civilians and still 
try to help the enemy, either acting as spies, blowing up stuff, or anything like that.”56  
                                                 
51Approved on February 25, 1945, the Technical Bulletin duplicated the contents of the GOPER with slight 
elaboration and presented the information in the format of an Army manual. 
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Soldiers, therefore, were taught to be cautious of the civilians and to view them as 
enemies and, in an effort to clearly communicate this directive, the pamphlet purposefully 
avoided calling the civilians Okinawans.  Despite receiving the CINCPAC-CINCPOA 
bulletin and the Ryukyu Handbook, the training consistently referred to the Okinawans as 
Japanese civilians or enemy civilians.57  As a result, soldiers did not always feel as if they 
received training that clearly differentiated between the two groups and each soldier 
interpreted the ethnicity of the Okinawans in his own way.  One explained that while he 
realized that the civilians were of Ryukyan descent, he viewed Okinawa as Japanese land 
peopled by Japanese.  “You have so many walking on two different cultures that, gosh, 
it’s hard to explain,” he remembered, “And that’s what we were all taught, you know, in 
the military that, hey, they’re all Japanese so there’s no need to separate them.”58  
Another soldier stated that “no one had heard of Okinawa . . . [only] that the island was 
infected with poisonous snakes . . . [and that] the natives were not Japanese but a more 
primitive people called Hairy Anus.”59  The complicated situation of Okinawa’s 
relationship with Japan perplexed the soldiers just as it did the planners.  The training did, 
however, communicate one thing clearly; regardless of whether the soldiers fully 
                                                 
57One such example: the label under a diagram of a proposed camp restroom facility in the Technical 
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understood Okinawan culture and ethnicity, they did not trust the civilians and remained 
fully aware of their potential for sabotage.60    
  On January 13, 1945, the troop ships stopped at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii to allow the 
detachment commanders to confer with the military government staff of Tenth Army.  
Only commanders attended the four day meeting; all other soldiers – officer and enlisted 
– remained onboard.  Crist distributed the finalized GOPER during the meeting.  
Additionally, he defined the mission of the “A” and “B” detachments as “confined almost 
entirely to providing suitable concentration and assembly areas.”61  Crist’s verbal 
guidance contradicted the GOPER.  The document specified that “A” detachments collect 
civilians and “B” detachments construct temporary camps as assembly points for 
evacuating civilians.  Crist’s input narrowly defined the duty of the “A” and “B” 
detachments to reconnoitering space for and establishing more permanent camps.  The 
contradiction caused major confusion for the military government commanders, 
particularly because Crist delivered both conflicting missions at the same meeting.  The 
distribution of the GOPER should have clarified duties for the commanders and their men 
and provided much desired insight into their overseas mission and new civil affairs 
duties.  Crist’s brief instead raised more questions.  The soldiers – commanders, officers, 
and enlisted - all arrived at their new units with no previous experience in conducting the 
actual duties of military government.  Now they faced their mission with limited time to 
train and only a vague notion as to how the different detachments should function and 
connect with the combat units. 
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 Four days later, on January 17, 1945, the troop transport ships left Honolulu for 
the Philippines with liaison officers from the Tenth Army Military Government Staff 
aboard.  These men led and supervised instruction on the mission and military 
government duties using the GOPER.  In accordance with the GOPER and Buckner’s 
intent, “anticipation of more complex and elaborate civil administration was 
discouraged.”62  While the addition of these officers aboard the ships made the document 
accessible to the soldiers, the officers also further modified the duties of the “A” and “B” 
detachments.  The officers decided to consolidate “the effort of the ‘A’ and ‘B’ teams 
toward taking care of displaced persons and paving the way for camp teams.”63  Although 
slight, the varied descriptions of the detachments’ duties made the conduct of the 
operation unclear to the soldiers and commanders.   
The arrival of the liaison officers also marked a shift in the command structure for 
the training program; instruction was now consolidated under a single commander on 
each ship.  Previously each detachment team had conducted its own training which meant 
that the soldiers received the instruction in small groups from their own superiors.  The 
new plan combined all the enlisted soldiers on the ship into one large training group.  The 
focus of the training also shifted; Japanese culture and language were replaced by 
rudimentary subjects such as Army organization and map reading.  The officers who had 
previously taught the material were now assigned to duties specified in the GOPER. 
Captain Horn, for example, no longer conducted language training because he served on 
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the censorship board.  As L-Day neared, all soldiers found themselves busy with 
important preparatory tasks and the training program dwindled.64 
On February 19, 1945, when the transport ships reached Leyte and the military 
government units joined up with their combat divisions, Japanese language training 
resumed.  Only five enlisted men per detachment, however, participated in the training.  
Throughout their time in the Philippines, the debate about the mission and purpose of the 
detachments continued in addition to new talk of how the combat divisions would 
function with the military government units.  Officers discussed issues of supply support 
and the scope of the units’ responsibilities on the actual battlefield.  Out of these 
discussions developed a new directive addressing the interaction of the soldiers with the 
civilian populace, a subject that the GOPER did not address.  The detachment 
commanders ordered the separation of civilians and soldiers into fenced enclosures 
constructed by Army engineer units to prevent fraternization and to restrict civilian 
access to military information.65  These regulations were based on the governing view of 
Okinawans as the enemy.      
By the time Buckner joined his troops in the Philippines, the training program for 
the treatment of civilians had been going for a month.  Supported by testimony that 
Japanese paratroopers in civilian clothing had been used in the fighting on Leyte, the 
training program enforced the notion that Okinawans must be treated as enemy.  The 
instruction informed soldiers that civilians on Okinawa were not from the Japanese 
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islands but “will be regarded as enemies and as likely to do us harm whenever 
opportunity offers, and would treat accordingly.”66  The soldiers continued to 
acknowledge the cultural differences of the Okinawans but identified them with the 
Japanese.  
By February 28, 1945, the mission of the ‘A’ and ‘B’ detachments had diverged 
so far from the original instructions in the GOPER that the detachment commanders 
began to speak of their task in loose, assumptive terms.  Lieutenant Colonel E.R. 
Mosman, commander of B-5 attached to 96th division, wrote that “it appeared that the 
function of the ‘B’ teams in this operation would be concerned almost entirely with 
internal administration of civilian collection stockades and providing labor.  No other 
duties outside the collection areas were contemplated.”67  The “B” detachments received 
formal and informal instruction describing a wide range of duties as varied as locating 
camps, establishing both temporary and permanent camps, and searching for misplaced 
civilians in an effort to prepare them for any task that may ultimately be assigned.  
On March 31, 1945, the eve of the landings on Okinawa, Lieutenant Colonel 
Mosman expressed exasperation about the uncertainty of his unit’s mission and recorded 
yet a different version of their possible duties in his command notes: “experiencing 
considerable difficulty in appraising position in the coming operation as related to 
Division plans regarding civilians but it appears this unit will serve as an ‘Advanced 
Team.’”68  With those words, Lieutenant Colonel Mosman went to bed, only to wake the 
next day and send his men into combat with no clarity on the particulars of their duties.  
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    ***** 
The main assault began on April 1, 1945, with the landing of combat units and the 
“A” detachments, followed by the landing of the “B” and “C” Detachments.  
Immediately the teams began setting up processing centers and registering retreating 
civilians in areas like Sunabe, Chatan, and Nugun.69  Army Engineers attached to the 
military government units quickly constructed barb wire fences and Military Police acted 
as guards in order to separate the civilians from the prisoners of war and the American 
soldiers.70 
American bombs and naval gunfire carpeted Okinawa prior to troops landing in 
order to minimize Japanese resistance, destroying seventy five percent of the homes and 
forcing the civilian population to retreat to lime rock caves.  In shock, starving, lice 
ridden, disease stricken and suffering injuries from bullets and shelling, civilians needed 
the temporary camps for preliminary medical care and food.71   
The battle flattened most of Okinawa’s structures and cities.  Private E.B. Sledge 
described the landscape as “shell blasted . . . treeless and increasingly low and flat.” 
Buckner described large cities such as Naha as “deserted ruins . . . most of it burned  
out . . . of no value except as a port.”  As the fighting continued and rain fell steadily, the 
destruction grew exponentially.  Okinawa, once considered “picturesquely beautiful,” 
now sat bogged down in mud so thick that vehicles couldn’t move through it.  The mud 
and knee-deep water hindered soldiers’ efforts to distribute ammunition and evacuate the 
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wounded.      Eventually, Naha’s last purpose as a port diminished as sunken ships 
blocked the harbor. Total shells expended by the Americans on Okinawa equaled nearly 2 
and three quarters million.  These shells flattened homes, burned out fields and crops, and 
killed civilians and Japanese soldiers alike.  Over a million shells lay unexploded on the 
roadways and throughout the countryside; civilians retreating from the frontlines risked 
detonating these charges as they walked.  An estimated 200,000 people – Okinawan, 
Japanese, and American – died, most of their bodies rotting in the humid air.  As part of 
the clean up effort following the hostilities, American troops dug mass graves in the once 
productive fields and thus limited farming possibilities.72 
In the few areas that did not suffer much bomb damage, sturdy homes and healthy 
crops lay abandoned.  With limited American supplies at the camps, such wasted 
resources contributed to tight rationing of food and a communal living environment.  
Close accommodations combined with the Okinawan custom of saving human feces for 
use as pig feed increased the likelihood of disease and the presence of rodents, flies, and 
mosquitoes.73  The abundance of casualties overwhelmed the early temporary camps and 
caused the “relative absence of public health and sanitation measures.”74  Staff Sergeant 
A.G. Karpen wrote a poem titled Japanese Garden describing the desecration of 
Okinawa.  It in, he juxtaposed beautiful imagery of Okinawa as an exotic Asian island 
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next to the brutality and carnage of the war.  “Come walk with me in gardens of the 
dead,” he wrote, “What lily-beds, the skulls, and yellow gentians the old unburied bones, 
what sacred odor of disintegrated flesh, what ample altars for glad offering to kind 
divinity are tanks shattered midst the garden’s carnage.  Naha’s rubble, all so delicate; 
and Itoman, sequestered, proudest bed of roses, red with blood and piles of roof slate.”75  
Seizen Nakasone, a Professor at the University of the Ryuykus, lamented, “I thought that 
this land, soaked with the blood of countless people would never be fit for human 
habitation again.”76 
Within the desolation and total decimation, the military government units had to 
create living conditions that would preserve and protect life.  Camp conditions varied 
depending upon what each location had available for salvage and how much time the 
Americans spent on each site to work continually on improvement.  The camp at Sunabe, 
for example, lasted for only five days.  Described as “rigorous,” the camp held 2,039 
civilians but only had two tarpaulins for shelter and no blankets for cooler night 
temperatures.  Given the size of the population, the tarpaulins covered only the elderly.77  
In contrast, the camp at Nodake, set up within a village, had the advantage of one 
hundred sixty seven houses available for use (only twenty two houses had burned 
down).78  With Nodake’s population at 6,000, civilians lived crowded together in the 
remaining structures.  The “C” detachment camp at Shimabuku created ten districts 
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fifteen days into the battle while at the same time struggling to secure an adequate water 
supply.79 
Despite the variation in the conditions, all camps operated under the basic 
principles outlined in the GOPER as further modified by detachment commanders.  
Every camp kept meticulous headcounts and filled out daily reports signed by the 
detachment commander who sent them through the division and XXIV Corps to the 
Tenth Army Military Government Staff.80  The staff then combined the data into a memo 
addressed to Crist, the Deputy Commander for Military Government.  By requesting 
specific data, the reports laid out Tenth Army’s priorities for the detachment – maintain 
an accurate headcount, control disease, provide basic needs through local salvage and 
organize the civilians into an Army wide beneficial labor force.  The reports included a 
demographic tally of the civilians by gender, location, and medical status and also a brief 
citation on sanitation and an extended paragraph on communicable diseases.81  Instances 
of typhus, meningitis and skin conditions appeared most frequently but only as isolated 
cases.82  Two reported cases of leprosy at the field hospital in Koza prompted discussions 
of evacuation and command involvement from Tenth Army.83 
The reports also dealt with supply and the status of salvage.  Buckner’s concerns 
about supply were warranted; the military government units saved their initial stock of 
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food and construction material for use as emergency rations and focused on local salvage 
immediately.84  As the war continued and local resources were slowly consumed, the 
failure of the promised resupply to arrive worried Americans and Okinawans alike.85  
Tenth Army recognized the effect the availability of local materials had on the living 
conditions of the camps and tracked salvage efforts closely.86 
The reports provided information on the labor projects of the civilians as well.  
The GOPER directed that civilian labor be available to any unit, including combat units, 
and the military government designed its program around the intent of the GOPER.  Most 
combat units, however, did not request the additional labor; civilians worked almost 
exclusively within the camps doing cooking, laundry, nursing, construction and, if 
available, farming.87 
American soldiers interacted with both the Japanese and the Okinawan civilians 
immediately upon landing.  Information received during training combined with hasty 
observations caused most soldiers to be able to differentiate between the Okinawans and 
the Japanese through simplistic, inaccurate methods.88  The ability of the soldiers to 
distinguish between the two ethnic groups was not based on an acute awareness of the 
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intricacies of culture and race.  Instead, the soldiers separated the groups based on 
elemental visual differences.  The Okinawans, rendered homeless by the intense shelling 
and fighting, walked in the muddy roads looking for shelter and carrying all their 
possessions.  They were filthy, scared, and unarmed.  Japanese soldiers wore military 
uniforms, carried weapons, and organized attacks against the Americans. As American 
soldiers encountered tired, weary, weak, scared, grimy local people not wearing the 
Japanese uniform or carrying weapons, they assumed they were Okinawan and 
categorized the Okinawans as “pathetic . . . pitiful . . .totally bewildered by the shock of 
[the] invasion . . . and scared to death of [the Americans].”89  Soldiers noted the 
“debilitated condition physically and mentally” of the local civilians. 90  Wrote one 
soldier from Camp Sunabe: “The attitude of the natives toward the American forces at 
this early stage can be described as one of passivity resulting from great shock and fright 
. . . completely docile.”91   
The American soldiers thus differentiated the Okinawans based on superficial, 
general, imprecise, and not always accurate assumptions.92  Okinawans did wear soiled, 
threadbare, dishelved clothing and were fearful, sick and injured, but these attributes 
were products of a destructive battle.  To the soldiers, however, the destitute state of the 
                                                 
89Sledge, With the Old Breed, 192. 
 
90Diary, April 3- April 8, 1945, Detachment B-5, 27. 
 
91Ibid., 23;  History of Military Government Operations on Okinawa, May 10, 1945, BG William E. Crist, 
17; Okinawa Diary, April 11, 1945, LTC John Stevens and MSG James M. Burns. 
 
92The Americans were aware that separating the Okinawans from the Japanese by visual cues such as 
demeanor and clothing had its flaws.  Propaganda leaflets distributed to the Okinawans warned them 
against wearing Japanese military clothing for warmth because the Americans would classify them as 
enemy soldiers.  The content of the leaflets demonstrated that the Americans felt apprehension towards all 
non-Americans and could not identify cultural differences between the two groups; their reliance on 
superficial means of separation, therefore, was heavy. (Leaflet 531, 563, Active 7(7-2-C) archive P, Kadena 
Air Base, KAB Archives). 
 33 
 
 
Okinawans invoked a paternalistic feeling of superiority.  The soldiers saw them as 
uncivilized, primitive and unintelligent rather than as war victims.93  Soldiers denigrated 
the condition of the locals by describing their belongings as “pitifully few and 
pathetically poor.”94  The training they received about Okinawa supported their 
paternalistic views. The Ryukyu Handbook, for example, described the Okinawans as 
“mild-mannered, courteous, and subservient” people who “do not value orderliness and 
cleanliness.”95  Despite the devastation of war causing the grimy look of the civilians, 
such training instilled a belief in the Americans that filth was intrinsic to Okinawan 
culture.  “They violate sanitary regulations,” explained Crist, “Because they have no real 
knowledge of sanitation.”96  Local practices, such as using human excrement as fertilizer, 
contributed to the Americans’ false assumptions about Okinawans as unclean.  Military 
government soldiers said the civilians “carefully hoarded” the excrement; soldiers 
worried that the sanitation situation, “including the odor, would probably deteriorate.”97  
Adherence to their own Western notions made the military government units emphasize a 
few unfamiliar farming practices as exemplary of the nature of the Okinawans as a group. 
While the American observation of the distressed Okinawans as docile and weak 
translated into paternalistic feelings, the majority of the Okinawans did, in fact, conduct 
themselves in a friendly manner.  To the surprise of the Americans, few civilians under 
the custody of the United States troops in the camps carried out subversive acts or 
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committed suicide.98  A XXIV Corps report stated that “the processing of civs [sic] posed 
no problems during the first months of the operation.”99  Captain R.W. Appleman, XXIV 
Corps historian, recorded that “the civilians presented no difficult problem and took care 
of themselves by and large, no serious difficulty developed.”100  Military government 
units observed no aggressive actions against Americans by civilians during the first eight 
days.101          
Yet, even while noting the harmless nature of the Okinawans, the soldiers did not 
disregard the potential of the civilians to incite violent chaos or spy.102  Corporal Robert 
L. Hostetler, Statistical Section Task Force, observed many years later that “every culture 
has their good people and their bad people.”103  Heeding the horror stories told on the 
transport ships about Japanese soldiers disguised as civilians, the Americans still viewed 
the Okinawans with suspicion, despite their helpless appearance.104  New rumors and 
stories about the covert actions of civilians against American forces circulated once the 
soldiers landed and, while these reports were not verified, they did fuel distrust.105  
Consistent with the soldiers’ training and orders, a generally wary attitude towards the 
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locals worked in harmony with the soldiers’ vigilant efforts at self preservation in a 
wartime environment.  Soldiers worried that “intelligence was getting to the enemy 
forces via itinerant civilians” who had run away from the military government camps.  
When Americans saw civilians wearing United States military uniforms given to them 
out of charity, the image heightened fear of espionage because it blurred the informally 
established visual identification lines.106  In both official and unofficial written 
correspondence, the term “enemy civilian” continued to appear as a reference to the 
Okinawans.107  Displaying the unease with which military government units approached 
civilians, XXIV Corps identified the “doubtful attitude” of “240,000 Ok[inawans]” to be 
“one of the major problems” that military government personnel sections had to contend 
with.108 
In the initial confrontation of Americans and Okinawans, the Americans found a 
destitute, poor civilian population that might do violence to the foreigners whose bombs 
and shells had rendered them homeless.  American soldiers used the same simplistic 
method to identify hostile Okinawans that they used to distinguish the Okinawans from 
the Japanese – how they looked.  As one soldier explained, “you could tell by their 
eyes.”109  Ultimately, they recognized that there existed no way to accurately sort out who 
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was enemy and who was not.  In the first month of battle, sheer survival suggested that 
caution be the ruling principle.110        
   The majority of the Okinawans living in the military government camps 
complied with American authority and posed no threat, but not all Okinawans on the 
island were non-combatants.  In addition to the few civilians that did spy from within the 
camps, a large portion of the Okinawan population served in military units on the side of 
the Japanese.111  American forces keenly noticed that “the middle aged group of men 
were missing” from the evacuation camps.112  Out of a population of several thousands at 
Camp Tobaru, military government officials reported only 50 men aged 17-45 years.113     
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In anticipation of the attack, the 32nd Imperial Army had arrived on Okinawa in 
March 1944.  Under the National Mobilization Act of 1944, the Japanese Army launched 
a campaign to prepare the island for the impending invasion.  The plan included 
construction projects, like building air strips and defenses, and mobilization programs to 
rally every Okinawan to the Japanese national cause.114  Okinawans participated in the 
war effort through farming, conscription, and nursing.  Young female students aged 
fourteen and older joined student nursing corps while young boys joined military fighting 
units.115  Organized by schools like the Okinawa Normal School and the Prefectual First 
Middle School, The Blood and Iron Corps (Tekketsu Kinnotai), under the supervision of 
the Japanese Imperial Forces, employed young boys as “suicidal attack corps.”116  
Okinawan adult men also fought for Japan as soldiers, either as augmentees to Japanese 
units or in Okinawan units called the Okinawan Home Guard (Boei Tai).117  As Senior 
Operations Officer of the 32nd Imperial Army Hiromachi Yahara explained, “All people 
young and old, men and women, along with military forces devoted themselves to 
protecting the imperial motherland.  This was the guiding principle that our military 
leaders had been emphasizing.”118   
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  Okinawan mobilization contributed significantly to Japanese fighting strength.  
Between December of 1944 and March of 1945, Japanese troop strength increased by 
16,000 because of the incorporation of the Okinawan Home Guard.119  While 
accommodating the possibility that Okinawans as individuals might act as spies, 
American forces underestimated their participation in actual combat units.120   Only when 
realizing the inconsistency between their calculations of the number of enemy casualties 
and the number of enemy troops did the Americans notice the active combatant role of 
the Okinawans.121  Earlier instruction emphasizing the rural background and cultural 
differences of the Okinawans from the Yamato Japanese of the mainland contributed to 
this miscalculation.122  Stated one officer, “[The] advanced propaganda [campaign] about 
an enchained race seeking liberation has perhaps clouded appreciation of the full extent 
of Ok [sic] contribution to the defense of their native land.”123  The consideration of the 
Okinawans’ relationship with Japan influenced American thinking when contemplating 
the enemy’s fighting ability and strength.  Of 1,113 prisoners of war tallied over a three 
week period, 424 were Boei Tai and 121 were military civilian employees.124  
Identifying the Okinawans from the Japanese was not a scientific process with 
foolproof results.  American soldiers tried their best to separate the innocuous civilians 
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from those civilians who intended to harm them.  Forming assumptions based off of 
training material and observation, the Americans recognized not only passivity and 
compliance but the potential for infiltration and deceit among the Okinawans.  For 
soldiers fighting in combat units, the intricate process of separating the Okinawans from 
the Japanese was less important; as combatants themselves, their concern was only with 
those who actively fought against them, regardless of ethnicity.125  Crowds of dislocated 
civilians along the roads were ignored or swiftly transferred to the military government 
units attached to the divisions.  For the military government soldiers administrating the 
camps, however, identifying Okinawans and Japanese as separate groups required 
extensive care and carried real consequences if done incorrectly.  Military government 
personnel slept in the same camps, mere yards away from the local residents.  To them, 
separating Japanese soldiers and Okinawans loyal to Japan from the majority of 
Okinawan refugees seeking relief was of paramount importance.  Their personal security 
depended upon it.     
The detachment commanders’ orders, issued on the transport ships, for rigid 
security measures were “for their protection and ours.”  Each civilian arriving to the 
camp underwent a screening process in order to discover any dangerous intentions and to 
find and remove any threatening weapon-like object.  Civilian men aged 17-45 were kept 
in stockades overnight.  Perimeter fences encased the camps and internal fencing 
separated American and Okinawan living areas.  No civilians could leave the camp 
without an American soldier escort.  Labor parties worked under guard.  Military police, 
when available, augmented some camps, conducted patrols and enforced anti-
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fraternization rules.  Dog patrols consisting of 12 men and 13 dogs guarded the camps 
while the military police rested in the evenings.126   
XXIV Corps ordered the strict security measures and each camp implemented 
them with as much rigor as their resources allowed.  Nodake, for example, did not have a 
perimeter fence because both military and local materials necessary for construction were 
not present in adequate amounts in the area.127  Personnel shortages posed the greatest 
difficulties; B-5, for example, consisted of only 23 soldiers and yet processed thousands 
of civilians, reaching a resident population of 6,999 by mid April.128  Units short on 
people sent requests for Military Police augmentees to XXIV Corps regularly.129   
In order to ensure that the civilians followed the directives of the Americans, 
military government units devised a set of punishments for rule breakers.  In the first few 
days of the battle, the soldiers only issued warnings to those civilians who disregarded 
the camp regulations.130  Before a week had passed, however, they realized that penalties 
needed to be increased.  Punishments included placing offenders in the stockades or 
denying the daily rice ration.131   
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Civilians committed infractions out of their own need for survival, not a desire for 
deviance.  They left the camp searching for family members or some salvageable food in 
abandoned fields.  American forces knew why the civilians escaped and organized 
salvage parties to procure food and supplies for all camp residents.132  They lacked the 
manpower, however, to escort every forlorn Okinawan and denied most requests.133  The 
urgency of the civilians to leave the camps combined with shortages of material and 
personnel resulted in “numerous problems [with] civilian control.”134 
XXIV Corps issued an order in response to this lack of control.  By April 11, 
1945, eleven days after the initial landings, any resident found leaving the camps or 
stealing food was to be shot.135  The order unambiguously directed perimeter guards to 
“stop all civilians leaving the village for crops or any reason, and upon failure to stop 
when ordered back, to fire at such civilians.”136  Each individual camp displayed 
standardized warning signs issued from XXIV Corps to alert the residents about the 
punishment of death.137  The public notices were written in Japanese, however, and thus 
disregarded the fact that older Okinawans only spoke and read Luchuan.138  American 
forces not only knew that the Okinawans spoke a different language than Japanese but 
also acknowledged that “sentences may be translated [between the two languages] word 
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for word without comprehension” and that the two languages were “mutually 
unintelligible.”139  Lack of training in Luchuan and its five dialects limited the language 
options for the bulletins but the Americans knew that “standard [Tokyo] Japanese [was] 
understood by many in the cities and towns.”140  The posted bulletins, while still 
unintelligible to some of the camp population, signified an honest effort by military 
government officials to communicate with the population and, while not always able to 
accommodate it, an awareness of the distinction between Okinawans and Japanese.   
Unfortunately, the threats in the postings coupled with the limits of language 
meant that some camp residents understood the penalty only by witnessing firsthand the 
consequences.  In Nodake, seven civilians were shot.141  One civilian was shot at Chatan, 
Maebaru, Shimabuku, and Tobaru.  Three were shot at Shimabaru.142  When guards fired 
at fleeing civilians, they rarely, if ever, delivered less than a death blow, proving that the 
intent of the order was to kill rather than maim.  Though the number of civilians killed 
remained low in comparison with the thousands residing in the camps, military 
government units followed the XXIV Corps order universally.  Buckner, upon visiting C-
3 at Shimabuku, applauded the camp as “well organized and doing useful work.”143      
Those shot had not threatened American soldiers or disclosed American secrets to 
the Japanese.  They had attempted to leave camp unaccompanied, had stolen food or 
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lingered around the ration dump.144  While the Americans had a real fear that Okinawans 
could potentially retreat back towards Japanese lines after they had lived in close 
proximity with American military information, such fears only partially explained the 
extreme punishment of death.  Notably, the American forces knew that most fleeing 
Okinawans intended to locate lost family members and left over food.  While death stood 
as a drastic consequence against crimes unrelated to enemy acts, civilian freedom of 
movement threatened security within the camps by diminishing the control of the 
undermanned military government units.  Severely outnumbered, the soldiers needed to 
enforce discipline to reduce the possibility of organized civilian treachery.  XXIV Corps 
issued the order in response to the military government units’ loosening grip on control of 
their camps.  The American knowledge of the Okinawans’ motivations for escaping 
meant that they did not shoot civilians because they considered them enemy combatants 
yet neither did they considered them harmless. 
The last shooting of a fleeing civilian occurred on April 26, 1945 at the 
Shimabaru camp when a civilian attempted to leave after sunset.145  For the remainder of 
the wartime occupation, ending with the surrender of the Ryukyus on September 7, 1945, 
no military government units shot any more civilians.146  Throughout the last four months 
of intense fighting, the military government units no longer saw a need for strict, deadly 
control over their camp populations.  As soldiers recognized the Okinawans’ quick 
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obedience to the regulations and close living increased familiarity between foreigner and 
local, individual military government units began to loosen the rigid restrictions.    
Punishment programs - whether stockades, food denial or death - alerted the 
Okinawan camp populations to the seriousness with which the Americans dealt with 
violations.  Contrary to what the Japanese had told them, the Okinawans discovered to 
their relief and surprise that the Americans did not intend to harm them.147  The Japanese 
horror stories about American torture, however, made the Okinawans mindful of the 
structure imposed on them.  As soon as they witnessed the consequences of disobedience, 
they complied. 
 Military government soldiers quickly noticed the effectiveness of their 
punishment policies in restoring order and maintaining control over thousands.  With the 
inclusion of death as a punishment, they observed the “virtually complete solution of the 
problem” of civilians leaving the camps on their own.148  A stockade constructed at 
Nodake for escapees who turned back before the Military Police could fire “was seldom 
required after the first few days.” 149  Within a month, “the penalty of cancelling the rice 
ration was threatened but not found necessary to be used.”150  
 Not only did the Okinawans choose cooperation over rebellion but they readily 
participated in the daily operations of the camps and assisted the Americans in camp 
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administration.151  One Okinawan man made additional leaflets about the consequence of 
death and posted them on paths that led away from Nodake.152  Regardless of the 
likelihood that the motivation of the man was more related to protecting his fellow 
Okinawans than working with the Americans, the soldiers viewed such actions as signs of 
not only compliance but team work towards a common goal.        
During the month of April, American soldiers began to link Okinawan obedience 
and cooperation in camp life to Okinawan culture and identity.  Soldiers compared 
Okinawans to other cultural groups like Filipinos and Japanese and used these 
comparisons in their favorable assessments of Okinawan behavior.  They viewed the 
Okinawans as “a lot more amenable to discipline than Filipinos and [with a] better 
standard of living.”153  They observed that “the rigid and arbitrary Japanese authoritarian 
disposition appeared strangely absent” in the work demeanor of the Okinawans.154  In 
observing the civilians’ compliant attitude during his visits to the camps, General 
Buckner also compared their behavior to that of the Japanese.  He called Okinawan 
women meek and claimed that Japanese women attempted to destroy American 
equipment with explosives during night attacks.  Buckner’s replacement, General Joseph 
Stilwell, similarly described the Japanese as ferocious, brutal and animal-like and the 
                                                 
151Ibid., 27. Camp Sunabe recorded that the civilians participated freely. Camps Heinza and Tsumia also 
had men in labor battalions exercising initiative and offering to assume positions of local leadership by 
May 13, 1945. (XXIV Corps Military Government Daily Operations Log, RG 407, File 224-12, NARA; 
27th Infantry Division memorandum to Commanding General, RG 389, Box 704, NARA; History of 
Military Government Operations on Okinawa, May 10, 1945, BG William E. Crist, 17-19). 
 
152Diary, April 1-30, 1945, Detachment B-5, 32. 
 
153Okinawa Diary, April 30, 1945, LTC John Stevens and MSG James M. Burns.  
 
154Diary, May 1-31, 1945, Detachment B-5, 48.  Okinawans “display almost none of the Japanese 
fanaticism.” (History of Military Government Operations on Okinawa, May 10, 1945, BG William E. Crist, 
18). 
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Okinawans as beautiful people.155  The Americans even compared the Okinawans to 
themselves, and found that the way they took initiative in camp life resembled an 
American leadership style characterized by compromise and rationality.156    
The military government units made special note of Okinawans that had spent 
time in the United States and, rather than inspiring sentiments of fear, close ties to 
America emphasized commonalities between the soldiers and civilians.  In contrast to the 
apprehension felt towards Japanese American citizens back home, connections that the 
Okinawans had with America encouraged understanding between the interned civilians 
and the American camp administrators.  Okinawans’ personal associations with America 
also worked to further estrange the Okinawans from the Japanese in the minds of the 
Americans.  More than just visitors to places like Hawaii and Los Angeles, California, 
some Okinawans had children stationed in Hawaii serving in the United States Army.  In 
comparison with the large camp populations, very few Okinawans had associations with 
America.157  The soldiers, however, gravitated towards the shared experience, giving the 
commonality great import in the formation of their opinions.  Soldiers began to view the 
Okinawans as on the American side and described civilians that aided camp activities as 
“responsible.”158   
                                                 
155Sarantakes, ed., Seven Stars, 35, 90. 
 
156
“The general attitude of [Okinawan] men were largely similar to the give and take common sense 
approach to situations which one would expect of American village leaders.” (Diary, May 1-31, 1945, 
Detachment B-5, 48). 
 
157Ibid., 41.  Roughly 7-10% of Okinawan camp residents had associations with America.  Out of those, the 
American connections varied greatly, ranging from a basic knowledge of the country and the English 
language to having lived in places along the Pacific Ocean like San Francisco, Hawaii and Los Angeles, 
sometimes for as much as twenty five years.   
 
158Ibid.; Captain Roy E. Appleman, notes, RG 407, File 224-12, NARA, 2.  “They exhibit no animosity 
toward Americans [and] declare their gratitude.  They do not exhibit any noticeable resentment against the 
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With such familial ties to America, the soldiers interpreted Okinawan efforts 
towards cooperation as larger gestures in support of the American viewpoint of the war.  
“Indeed,” wrote one soldier, “the fact that some of them had lived in the United States 
undoubted ameliorated there [sic] attitudes.”159  By April 30, 1945, soldiers recognized a 
trend in the attitude of the civilians; most expressed a preference for the influence of the 
United States government on Okinawa over the Japanese government.160  In Nodake, 
questioning exposed that “civilians generally refrained from expressing views hostile to 
Japan, but did state they would prefer the rule of the United States.”161  Though the 
military government soldiers who queried the civilians at Nodake considered the pro-
American response to be linked to Okinawan concerns about economic distress, the 
sentiment nonetheless contributed to an increasing comfort felt by the Americans towards 
the Okinawans.  The local people, initially viewed with suspicion and dismissed with 
insulting assumptions about their child-like nature, gradually represented a cooperative 
populace that might share principles with their foreigner invaders.  
By the end of April, obedience, cooperation and a feeling of kinship resulted in 
adjustment in policy at the individual camps.162  The loosened restrictions did not 
originate from XXIV Corps or Tenth Army.  Instead, they grew gradually as each camp 
                                                                                                                                                 
American soldier.” (History of Military Government Operations on Okinawa, May 10, 1945, BG William 
E. Crist, 19). 
 
159Diary, May 1-31, 1945, Detachment B-5, 48. 
 
160Okinawa Diary, April 30, 1945, LTC John Stevens and MSG James M. Burns, Okinawa Diary; 
Sarantakes, ed., Seven Stars, 34; Diary, 1944-1945, Detachment B-5, 48; XXIV Corps Military 
Government Daily Operations Log, RG 407, File 224-12, NARA. 
 
161Diary, May 1-31,1945, Detachment B-5, 47. 
 
162Every military government camp, in varying degrees, relaxed their strict guidelines around the end of 
April/early May.  (Diary, April 1 – May 31, 1945, Detachment B-5, 40-55; XXIV Corps Military 
Government Daily Operations Log, RG 407, File 224-12, NARA; History of Military Government 
Operations on Okinawa, May 10, 1945, BG William E. Crist, 17-20). 
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commander assessed the situation through careful consideration of the improvement in 
overall control, the positive contributions of the civilians and the perceived growing rift 
between the Okinawans and the Japanese.163  The situations each commander 
encountered by late April and early May were the same as they had dealt with in early 
April at the outbreak of the battle.  How they chose to handle the incidents, however, was 
quite different.  When confronted with possible espionage more than a month into the 
battle, camp commanders displayed more trust towards the Okinawans and favored their 
innocence.   
American suspicion and paternalism towards the Okinawans, however, did not 
disappear. The battle still waged fiercely and the possibility of treachery was still present.  
The military government units, for example, continued to record the names of civilians 
who had relatives in the Japanese Army.164  The Americans, however, trusted the 
Okinawans to collect this information themselves and the list did not inspire additional 
vigilance by the military government.  Despite being still cognizant of their vulnerability 
living closely with the Okinawans, the Americans trusted the camp residents on a level 
unseen earlier in the battle.  Compared to decisions made soon after the landing when 
suspicion quickly turned into accusation, the leniency signified a change in the 
Americans’ view of the Okinawans and their identity as a people. 
                                                 
163This exercise of authority was consistent with the guidance in the GOPER.  General Buckner encouraged 
his subordinate leaders to make decisions at their level based on the circumstances they encountered.  The 
GOPER also stated that the civilians could earn back their freedom by behaving favorable.  Even though 
the camp commanders lacked an explicit order from XXIV Corps or Tenth Army directing the shift in 
policy, their adjustment of policy based on perceived changes in the Okinawans’ behavior fell within the 
general parameters laid out in the GOPER. (Operational Directive #7, January 6, 1945, Commanding 
General, Tenth Army, 2). 
 
164Diary, May 1-31, 1945, Detachment B-5, 47. 
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  In Nodake, for example, precise shelling of a nearby American gun position 
alerted the military government soldiers of B-5 of a possible breach of security.  After the 
96th Division Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) detachment finished interviews with the 
civilian camp population and submitted them for review, the camp commander decided 
that no evidence existed against any Okinawans and no disciplinary action of any type 
was appropriate.  He cited as reasons for his decision the cooperation and usefulness of 
the Okinawans in camp productivity and their identity as Okinawans, not as Japanese.  “It 
may be noted,” he wrote, “that while a number of Japanese flags were taken from 
arriving civilians, the inhabitants on questions as to being ‘Japanese’ asserted themselves 
to be ‘Okinawan,’ not Japanese.”165  A similar situation during the first month of battle 
would probably have caused the suspected offenders to spend at least one night in the 
stockade.  By April 30, 1945, the military government soldiers disassociated the 
Okinawans from the Japanese; the Okinawans were no longer viewed as enemy civilians.   
This realignment of identity altered military government policy within the 
individual camps.166  In addition to ending the use of death as a consequence after April 
25, 1945, military-aged men no longer spent their evenings in guarded barbed wire 
enclosures in the center of the camps.167  At Shimabaru, the value of the Okinawans as 
workers outweighed any fears of organized rebellion.  Military government soldiers 
                                                 
165Diary, April 1-30, 1945, Detachment B-5, 32.  “The people call themselves Okinawans rather than 
Japanese.” (History of Military Government Operations on Okinawa, May 10, 1945, BG William E. Crist, 
18). 
 
166For more examples of lesser punishments for similar crimes see XXIV Corps Military Government Daily 
Operations Log, RG 407, File 224-12, NARA.  On April 20th at Maebaru, two civilians seen with a 
Japanese soldier were only arrested by the military police. (The Japanese soldier was shot).  A similar 
incident occurring earlier in the month may have resulted in the shootings of the civilians as well.   
 
167The barbed wire stockades still existed as punishment but their use was far less frequent.  One camp, for 
example, only used them four days out of the entire month of May.  The offenders had roamed into off-
limits areas and refused to answer questions linked to espionage.  Similiar crimes had warranted the death 
penalty a month earlier. (Diary, May 1-31, 1945, Detachment B-5, 47). 
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found it important to send the civilians to work some of the few surviving crops and 
increase the food supply.  While a few soldiers still guarded work parties that grew food 
outside of the camp, civilians conducted their work within camp under little to no 
supervision.  From the beginning of the battle, civilians had received job tasks from the 
military government; by late in the month, however, civilians completed those daily tasks 
with a greatly increased level of independence.168    
 By April 30, 1945, Okinawans held camp leadership positions.  The Americans 
divided up the living sectors and assigned locals to oversee them.  They interviewed each 
candidate about their previous experience with government, their social and economic 
status within their village and their attitude towards the United States.169  Chosen leaders 
had some English language skills, ties to America, and credibility within their 
community. One man chosen as the Civilian Public Safety Headman in Nodake had 
served as the Major of Ginowan for 15 years.170  Another named Kamajo had lived in 
California for 27 years.171  
The selected local leaders underwent a three week trial period and, upon assuming 
their positions, possessed only limited authority.  Local leaders oversaw food ration 
                                                 
168Okinawa Diary, April 30, 1945, LTC John Stevens and MSG James M. Burns. The change in military 
government policy based on Okinawan cooperation and obedience and the American perception that the 
Okinawans were not Japanese and had loyalty and kinship towards the United States did not erase all 
security measures.  Inbound civilians still underwent a screening process, living quarters for Americans and 
Okinawans remained separate, and rule infractions still warranted punishment (although infrequently and 
on a less severe scale). (Diary, May 1-31, 1945, Detachment B-5, 45-47; XXIV Corps Military 
Government Daily Operations Log, RG 407, File 224-12, NARA).  
 
169Interview Sheet for Prospective Local Leaders, Appendix to Military Government Operations Report – 
Ryukyus, August 2, 1945, RG 407 Box 2487, file 110-5, NARA. 
 
170Diary, April 1 – May 31, 1945, Detachment B-5, 41. 
 
171Ibid., 36, 41, 48; The Battle of Okinawa: Oral Histories, (Okinawa: Prefectual Peace Memorial Museum, 
1990) as told by Eikichi Shiroma, 9; Okinawa Diary, April 30, 1945, LTC John Stevens and MSG James 
M. Burns; 27th Infantry division memorandum to the Commanding General, RG 389, Box 704, NARA. 
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distribution and assisted in rule enforcement by communicating the regulations to the 
population.172  They also served on firefighting teams and recommended other civilians 
who they believed deserved positions of responsibility.  The soldiers retained the right to 
dismiss local leaders that they believed had failed in their duties; however, the use of 
local leaders increased the stability and control of camp life.173  The decision by 
Americans to establish local government demonstrated confidence, reliance, and some 
degree of trust in the Okinawans.  The rapid emergence of local government in the midst 
of battle, although rudimentary, signified progress on the part of the Americans towards 
reevaluating the Okinawans and their identity.174 
Military government units now diverted the low supply of salvaged construction 
materials to projects unrelated to security.175  Camps grew into more permanent 
communities and the Americans added playgrounds, schools, orphanages, and nursing 
homes with materials that had once built stockades.176  Soldiers also began to share their 
military rations and old uniforms with cold and hungry civilians despite previous 
                                                 
172History of Military Government Operations on Okinawa, May 10, 1945, BG William E. Crist, May 10, 
1945,18.  No local leaders had the authority to prosecute or punish rule breakers.  In many ways, the power 
of the local leaders lay with easing cultural conflict and language translation. (Diary, April 1-May 31, 1945, 
Detachment B-5, 42, 35). 
 
173Captain Roy E. Appleman, notes, RG 407, File 224-12, NARA, 2-3; Local Government Situation 
Report, Appendix, RG 398, Box 704, NARA; Diary, May 1- 31, 1945, Detachment B-5, 47-48. 
 
174Local government at the initial stage of the occupation was considered a lofty goal and was not a priority 
for the planners.  The GOPER laid out guidance for a hasty occupation under wartime conditions that 
corralled civilians and herded them away from hostile fires.  Local government after the surrender carried 
greater importance as occupation goals transitioned towards economic stability and the reestablishment of 
villages. (Operational Directive #7, January 6, 1945, Commanding General, Tenth Army, 9). 
 
175Military Government Action Report, 1 April–30 June 1945, XXIV Corps, RG 407, Box 2153, NARA, 5. 
 
176Diary, April 1- May 31, 1945, Detachment B-5, 40, 49; The Battle of Okinawa: Oral Histories, 
(Okinawa: Prefectual Peace Memorial Museum, 1990). 
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regulations forbidding such actions.177  By May 31, 1945 military government supply 
officers sought out discarded American uniforms from salvage dumps and issued them to 
civilians.  To dispel any apprehension when viewed by tactical units, the military 
government supply sections painted the word “civilian” in white on each shirt.178  The 
relaxed restrictions fostered an environment of friendship and encouraged the soldiers to 
interact with the civilians in casual, social settings.  Two soldiers enjoyed tea with a 
family and several local nurses had to be moved away from Nodake to the camp in Koza 
after beginning romantic relationships with American soldiers.179 
    ***** 
The mission of military government to remove the civilians from the battlefield 
and support the main combat mission of securing the island never changed throughout the 
battle.  Likewise, the priorities of safeguarding American lives and maximizing resources 
also continued to drive policy.  American perceptions of Okinawan identity, however, 
changed as the battle progressed.  Continual interaction with the Okinawans showed the 
population to be obedient and cooperative.  American military government soldiers found 
similarities between themselves and the Okinawans that promoted a degree of trust.  
Contrasting sharply with pre-battle assumptions of the Okinawan disposition, Okinawan 
behavior caused American military government personnel to reassess their perception of 
Okinawan identity which in turn modified policy.  American planners, commanders, and 
                                                 
177Detachment Daily Report, RG 407, File 224-12, NARA; 7th division, speech transcript, Inclosure 2, Civil 
Affairs, RG 407, File 224-12, NARA, 2; XXIV Corps After Action Review #125, RG 407, File 224-12, 
NARA; Diary, 1944-1945, Detachment B-5, 22, 28,31,51; Inafuku, speech; XXIV Corps Military 
Government Preliminary Planning, RG 407, File 224-12, NARA; Mike Daly, “irei-no-hi: A Day of 
Remembrance,” Okinawa Living (June 2007): 75; Hostetler, interview. 
 
178Diary, May 1-31, 1945, Detachment B-5, 52. 
 
179Ibid., 33. 
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soldiers continually evaluated the culture and ethnicity of Okinawa as well as its political 
connections to Japan when making decisions about how the American forces would 
conduct the occupation. 
Inside the military government camps on the Okinawan battlefield the soldiers 
encountered the complexities of race when faced with two ethnic groups – Okinawans 
and Japanese - that appeared to them to be racially alike.  As military government 
soldiers, their job required them to not only safeguard their fellow American soldiers but 
to sustain the lives of thousands of civilians who appeared more similar to the enemy 
than themselves.  Broad generalizations of the racial and ethnic character of the enemy 
promoted by combat planners to protect American soldiers’ lives conflicted with the war 
experience of the military government soldier.  Within the camps, the military 
government soldiers had to make a sophisticated distinction between two ethnic groups 
from the same country.   
The initial Okinawa experience weakens Dower’s thesis of crude racial 
stereotyping.  Racial hostility between the Japanese and the Americans did not translate 
into unorthodox and unnecessarily cruel policies or behavior.  American planners for the 
occupation of Okinawa instituted policy that lacked bitter race hate.  Despite following 
such violent engagements as Peleileu and Iwo Jima, occupation policy for Okinawa did 
not contain overtly harsh procedures.  American planners’ consideration of race and 
ethnicity produced logically reasoned policies instituted to ensure the success of the 
combat mission.   
 Dower correctly argues for strong racism expressed by both sides, yet the 
planning and conduct of military government in Okinawa demonstrates that racial 
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confrontation did not always dissolve into ill-informed generalizations and assumptions.  
American soldiers challenged the negative images of the Japanese by embracing the 
Okinawans; they responded to people of a different ethnicity through conscious 
evaluation based on interactions with them.  Dower’s thesis limits such an open analysis 
and, instead, determines that race carried an overriding negativity.  While Dower is 
correct that the confrontation of the Americans and the Japanese on the battlefields of the 
Pacific was brutal and that notions of race were present, the diverse ethnicities 
encountered on Okinawa and how the American military government dealt with those 
ethnicities dispels the idea that racial confrontation dominated American behavior.  
Military government planners, commanders and soldiers’ contemplation of race in policy 
making in the early occupation of Okinawa resulted in the implementation of policy that 
was characterized by constant and open evaluation of ethnically different people. 
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